I. Introduction
Aggregate signature scheme is helpful for the real time application such as limited bandwidth and low computation. Boneh et al [1] proposed the concept of aggregate signature scheme in 2003. Certificate signature allows mapping nsignatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users into a single length signature. Al-riyami and Paterson [2] proposed the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) in 2003 which theyprovide the solution of key escrow problem that inherit from the Identity based public key cryptography. In CL-PKC, third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) involves for generating the user's partial private key and user select their private key by using the secret value. Result of this activity escape with the key escrow problem because user secret key is not completely known by the Private Key Generator (PKG) as in Identity based cryptography. Identity based public key cryptography scheme was introduced by Shamir et al [3] in 1984 which gives the solution of key authentication of sender but creates the well-known problem key escrow problem. In identity based cryptography third party Private Key Generator (PKG) generate the whole private key of the user while user select his public by any identity such as email or license number, address number etc that create the key escrow problem. According to the Al-riyami and Paterson [2] , CLAS scheme have two types of adversary called type I and type II. Type I adversary has potential to replace the public key of user while have no control on the master key of the user. Type II adversary knows the master key of the KGC while it cannot replace the public key of the user. Furthermore, Huang et al [5] classify these adversaries on their potential power such as Super type, Strong type, Normal type adversary I and adversary II and proposed two CLAS scheme in which first scheme is secure against Normal type I and Super type II where second scheme is secure against Super type I and type II. Liu et al [6] proposed an CLAS scheme in which they proves their scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack but Zheng and Wang [7] found insecure Liu et al [6] CLAS scheme by applying concrete attacks with type II adversary. Xiong et al [8] proposed an certificateless aggregate signature scheme and that their CLAS scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attack of type I and Type II adversary but Hou et al [10] found their scheme is insecure and gives an improvement CLAS scheme. Cheng et al [9] also proves that Xiong et al [8] scheme is also insecure against honest but curious and malicious but passive attack. Deng et al [4] proves that Hou et al [10] scheme is insecure against malicious but passive attack and gives an improvement CLAS scheme and show that this scheme is secure against malicious but passive attack. In this paper we prove that Deng et al [4] is insecure against the honest but curious attack by type II adversary while it is secure against malicious but passive attack.
II. Review of the Deng et al [4] CLS Scheme
The symbol table is given below. 
III. Cryptanalysis of Deng et al [4] CLS scheme
In this subsection we discuss the type II attack on behalf we claim that proposed CLS scheme is insecure. Since KGC knows the master key, then KGC compute the value 
Compute fix value:
Forge partial signature: Now KGC perform the following step to forge CLS signature ) , ( 
V. Conclusion
Recently, Deng et al [4] proposed an efficient improvedCLAS scheme of Hou et al [10] CLAS scheme. In this paper, we first give a detail review of Deng et al CLS and CLAS scheme then show that proposed CLAS is insecure against concrete attacks. We point out that the security leaks of the scheme that is depends on the user secret key usk and i r . We proposed a certificateless signature scheme to remove the security leaks arise in Deng et al [4] .
